In this paper we explore the potential gains that a trade agreement (TA) can provide by regulating trade-policy uncertainty, in addition to the more standard gains from reducing the mean levels of trade barriers. We show that in a standard trade model with income-risk neutrality there tends to be an uncertainty-increasing motive for a TA. With income-risk aversion, on the other hand, the uncertainty-managing motive for a TA is determined by interesting trade-o¤s. For a given degree of risk aversion, an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA is more likely to be present when the economy is more open, the export supply elasticity is lower and the economy is more specialized. Governments have stronger incentives to sign a TA when the trading environment is more uncertain. As exogenous trade costs decline, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty tend to become more important relative to the gains from reducing average trade barriers. We also derive a simple "su¢ cient statistic"to determine whether there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA: this is the case if, at the noncooperative equilibrium, an adjusted measure of the exporting country's openness co-varies with the importing country's tari¤ as a result of the shocks. Finally, we investigate the impact of a TA on investment and trade via changes in trade-policy uncertainty.
Introduction
Policy practitioners often argue that a central bene…t of trade agreements is to reduce trade policy uncertainty. Indeed, the WTO and other trade agreements explicitly state that one of their goals is to increase the predictability of the trade policy environment. 1 The 2008 great recession illustrates the potential value of such agreements in reducing trade policy uncertainty.
During that crisis there was widespread fear of disastrous trade wars, such as those in the 1930's that preceded (and spurred) the creation of the GATT. But while applied protection increased, the worst fears were not realized (cf. Bown, 2011) . It is at least conceivable that one of the reasons why trade wars did not happen is that countries are constrained by trade agreements that limit policy variation even under large shocks.
In spite of the importance that policy makers and international institutions attribute to the notion of an uncertainty-reducing role of trade agreements, we know little about its theoretical underpinnings. A large body of theory has explored the possible roles of a trade agreement as a means to correct international policy externalities (e.g. Grossman and Helpman [1995] , Bagwell and Staiger [1999] and Ossa [2011] ) and to allow governments to commit vis-a-vis domestic actors (e.g. Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [1998] and Limão and Tovar-Rodriguez [2011] ). But this research focuses on the role of a trade agreement in managing the level of trade barriers, not their uncertainty.
The main objective of our paper is to explore the conditions under which there is a policyuncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement, and examine the potential gains that such an agreement can provide by regulating trade-policy uncertainty, above and beyond the more standard gains from reducing the levels of trade barriers. A further aim of our paper is to investigate the impact of a trade agreement on investment and trade via changes in tradepolicy uncertainty.
We focus on a scenario where there are no frictions in contracting between governments, so that the agreement is a complete contingent contract. Since we are focusing on the motives and potential gains from a trade agreement, rather than its design, focusing on a setting without transaction costs seems like a natural …rst step. In the Conclusion we discuss brie ‡y how the 1 For example, the WTO's web site states that "Just as important as freer trade -perhaps more important -are other principles of the WTO system. For example: non-discrimination, and making sure the conditions for trade are stable, predictable and transparent." Several preferential trade agreements such as some of those entered into by the United States, the European Union and by developing countries often claim that they aim to 'reduce distortions to trade'and 'ensure a predictable environment for business planning and investment '. presence of contracting frictions may a¤ect our basic insights.
To isolate the uncertainty-managing motive for a trade agreement we perform the following thought experiment: we focus on the optimal "mean preserving agreement,"that is the optimal agreement among those that keep the average trade barrier at the same level as in the noncooperative equilibrium. If this agreement leads to a policy distribution that is di¤erent from the noncooperative one, we say that there is an "uncertainty-managing motive" (or simply an "uncertainty motive") for a trade agreement, and if it reduces policy uncertainty relative to the noncooperative equilibrium we say that there is an "uncertainty-reducing motive"for the trade agreement.
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The …rst step of our analysis is to examine a simple framework in which government objectives are speci…ed in reduced form as functions of a trade policy and an underlying shock.
Starting from a reduced-form framework with relatively little structure is useful for several reasons. First, the framework delivers general formulas for the direction of the uncertainty motive and the gains from regulating policy uncertainty, which admit intuitive interpretations and make the logic of our results very transparent. Second, these formulas can be readily applied to a speci…c model structure to examine the fundamental determinants of the uncertainty motive and the associated gains. And third, the framework can in principle be interpreted as applying also to other types of international agreements, such as environmental or investment agreements.
Initially we focus on a setting where only one country (Home) chooses a trade barrier, which exerts a negative externality on a policy-passive country (Foreign); but later we extend the model to allow for two policy-active countries. The noncooperative level of the trade barrier is increasing in the underlying shock. We identify two key e¤ects that determine whether there is an uncertainty motive for a trade agreement, and if so, in what direction it goes. The …rst one is what we label the policy-risk preference e¤ect, 3 determined by the concavity/convexity of Foreign's payo¤ with respect to Home's policy: when the Foreign country is policy-risk averse, this e¤ect works in favor of an uncertainty-reducing motive. Intuition might suggest that this 2 We also consider an alternative thought experiment, which focuses on the tari¤ schedule that a government would unilaterally choose if it were constrained to deliver the same mean as the optimal agreement. If such "mean-preserving unilateral" choice exhibits more uncertainty than the optimal trade agreement, we say that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive. In section 2 we discuss the similarities and di¤erences between the results under the two thought experiments, and the reasons why we focus the analysis on the mean-preservingagreement thought experiment. 3 In this paper we use the words "risk" and "uncertainty" interchangeably.
e¤ect is all that matters for determining whether there is "too much"or "too little"risk in the noncooperative policy. And indeed this is the case when the shock a¤ects the Foreign country only through Home's policy ("political economy" shock). However, when the shock a¤ects the Foreign country also in a direct manner ("economic" shocks), there is an additional e¤ect that we label externality-shifting e¤ect. If a higher level of the shock strengthens the marginal international policy externality holding the policy level constant, this e¤ect works in favor of the uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement. In this case, therefore, the uncertainty motive can go in the opposite direction as the Foreign country's policy-risk preference.
Our next step is to apply the general conditions and formulas derived in the reducedform framework to a more structured trade model. More speci…cally, we focus on a standard competitive general-equilibrium trade model with two sectors, where the Home country is large and the Foreign country is small and maximizes welfare. We allow individuals to be income-risk averse. In the basic model we consider shocks of the political-economy type, but we later extend the model to allow for more general shocks.
It is natural to start by focusing on the benchmark case of income-risk neutral individuals. In this case we …nd that there tends to be an uncertainty-increasing motive for a trade agreement.
The reason for this result is that, given the political-economy nature of the shock, all that matters for the uncertainty motive is the Foreign country's policy-risk preference (as mentioned above), and in the presence of income-risk neutrality the Foreign country tends to be policy-risk loving. This is due to the convexity of the indirect utility function and of the revenue function in prices, re ‡ecting the ability of …rms and consumers to make decisions after observing prices.
Interestingly, then, the standard trade model with income-risk neutrality seems at odds with the often-heard informal argument that trade agreements can provide gains by reducing tradepolicy uncertainty.
When we consider the more general case where individuals may be income-risk averse, we …nd that the uncertainty-managing motive for a trade agreement is determined by interesting trade-o¤s. First, if income-risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, for a given degree of risk aversion the uncertainty motive for a trade agreement is more likely to be in the direction of reducing uncertainty when the economy is more open, when the export supply elasticity is lower and when the economy is more specialized.
We note that, empirically, lower-income countries tend to have lower export supply elastic-ities and a lower degree of diversi…cation, thus at a broad level our model suggests that the uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement should be more important for lower-income countries than for higher-income countries.
The uncertainty motive for a trade agreement is a¤ected in interesting ways by changes in exogenous trade costs (e.g. transport costs). We show that, if risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong, as the trade cost declines from its prohibitive level initially there is an uncertaintyincreasing motive for a trade agreement, but this turns into an uncertainty-decreasing motive as the trade cost becomes su¢ ciently low. Thus the model broadly suggests that uncertaintyreducing motives for trade agreements should emerge and become more important as the world becomes more integrated.
Next we examine the potential gains that a trade agreement can provide by regulating trade-policy uncertainty, and compare them with the more standard gains from regulating the trade-policy mean. We isolate the latter gains by focusing on an "uncertainty-preserving agreement," 4 while the gains from regulating policy uncertainty are captured by the gains from a mean-preserving agreement. We consider local approximations of the gains from such agreements starting from the noncooperative policy schedule.
The most notable results concern how these gains depend on the underlying degree of uncertainty and on the exogenous trade cost. We …nd that an increase in the variance of the shock leads to larger gains from regulating policy uncertainty, while it does not a¤ect the gains from regulating the policy mean, and as a consequence it implies larger overall gains from a trade agreement. This in turn suggests that governments should have a higher propensity to sign a trade agreement when the trading environment is more uncertain.
We show that trade costs have a non-monotonic impact on the relative gains from regulating policy uncertainty and on the gains from regulating the policy mean. Interestingly, if trade costs are low enough that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive, further reductions in trade costs will tend to increase the relative gains from reducing policy uncertainty and shrink the gains from reducing the policy mean. Thus at a broad level our model suggests that, as the world becomes more integrated, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty are likely to become more important relative to the gains from reducing the mean levels of trade barriers.
We then provide a simple condition that can be used to determine the direction of the un-4 Speci…cally, an uncertainty-preserving agreement is an agreement that shifts the tari¤ schedule in a way that changes the mean but preserves all the higher central moments (variance, skewness, kurtosis, etc.) . certainty motive for a trade agreement using very parsimonious information. We start from the observation that the international externality exerted by Home's tari¤ is given by an adjusted measure of Foreign's openness, where the adjustment factor involves real per capita income and the degree of income risk aversion, and show that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive if and only if, at the noncooperative equilibrium, the adjusted openness co-varies with the tari¤ as a result of the shocks. We illustrate with a simple example how this "su¢ cient statistic" approach can be used to check the direction of the uncertainty motive for a speci…c bilateral trading relationship, namely the one between the US and Cuba in the period before their 1934 agreement. We …nd a positive correlation between US tari¤s and Cuban adjusted openness when calculated at reasonable levels of risk aversion, which suggests that indeed there was an uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement between them. Our model is extremely stylized and so this exercise is should be interpreted with caution. But we think it suggests that the model can be taken to the data in a meaningful way, and it points to a potential direction for future research: developing richer versions of the model and taking them to richer datasets.
Next we extend the model to allow for more general economic shocks. In this case, as mentioned above, in addition to the policy-risk-preference e¤ect there may be a policy-externalityshifting e¤ect. This latter e¤ect operates through two possible channels: …rst, to the extent that the shock a¤ects domestic economic conditions in the Home country, it will a¤ect the Foreign country through the terms-of-trade; and second, to the extent that the shock a¤ects domestic economic conditions in the Foreign country, it will have a further impact on this country.
We discuss conditions under which the externality-shifting e¤ect strengthens the uncertaintyreducing motive for a trade agreement. We also note that the "su¢ cient statistic" approach described above is applicable in this more general setting as well.
In our basic model, factors can be allocated only after uncertainty is resolved. In section 5 we extend the model to allow for ex-ante investments. We show that the conditions that determine the uncertainty motive for a trade agreement in the presence of ex-ante investments are similar to those derived in the static model, provided the market allocation of capital is e¢ cient given Home's trade policy. There is no separate uncertainty motive associated with investment because, even though the trade agreement can a¤ect capital allocation, this has no …rst order e¤ect on Foreign's objective, due to the e¢ ciency of the allocation. Nevertheless, an agreement that regulates policy uncertainty does a¤ect equilibrium investment and trade relative to the noncooperative equilibrium. For the case of political-economy shocks, we show that if income-risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong and the support of the shock su¢ ciently small, there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement, and the reduction in policy uncertainty leads to more investment in the export sector. Under those conditions we also …nd that the expected volume of trade increases, provided the export supply elasticity does not increase too rapidly with the price.
Finally, we extend the analysis to allow for two (symmetric) policy-active countries. The general condition that determines the direction of the uncertainty motive for a trade agreement in this case still includes the policy-risk-preference and externality-shifting e¤ects, but now there is an additional e¤ect, which works in favor of an uncertainty-reducing motive if tari¤s are strategic substitutes, and against it if they are strategic complements.
The increasing interest in trade agreements in the presence of uncertainty has generated a few papers, but their focus is very di¤erent from ours. Typically, they consider the implications of contracting imperfections (such as private or non-veri…able information, or contracting costs) and how they can explain certain design features of trade agreements. For example, Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010) , Amador and Bagwell (Forthcoming) and Beshkar and Bond (2012) show that the presence of uncertainty and contracting imperfections can explain the use of rigid tari¤ bindings.
5 In contrast to these papers, we focus on the uncertainty-managing motive for a trade agreement and the gains that a trade agreement can provide by regulating policy uncertainty.
Also, there is a small but growing empirical literature on trade agreements and uncertainty. Cadot et al. (2011) show evidence that regional trade agreements reduce trade-policy volatility in agriculture. 6 Rose (2004) and Mans…eld and Reinhardt (2008) empirically examine the e¤ect of trade agreements on the volatility of trade ‡ows, but this is di¤erent from the volatility of trade policies. Finally, the impact of uncertainty-reducing trade agreements on trade ‡ows and …rms'investment into foreign markets is modeled and tested by Handley and Limão (2012) and Handley (2011) . But whereas they take trade policy (before and after a trade agreement) as exogenous, we make it endogenous.
We structure the paper in the following way. In section 2 we lay out a basic framework with only one policy-active country and reduced-form government objectives. In section 3 we consider a standard trade model with political economy shocks, and explore the determinants of the uncertainty motive for a trade agreement and the gains from regulating policy uncertainty and policy mean. In section 4 we extend the basic model to allow for more general economic shocks. In section 5 we allow for ex-ante investments and explore the impact of an uncertaintyreducing trade agreement on investment and trade. In section 6 we extend the analysis to a setting with two policy-active countries. In section 7 we conclude. The Appendix contains the proofs of our results.
Basic framework
To make our points transparent, we start by focusing on a two-country setting where only one country is policy-active, hence there is a one-way international policy externality. In this section we model government objectives in reduced form, as functions of a trade policy and an underlying shock; in the next section we will "open up"the black box of government objectives in the context of a standard trade model.
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. The Home government chooses a trade policy t, while the Foreign government is passive (in section 6 we will allow for two policy-active countries). We let G(t; ) denote the Home government's objective function, where represents an exogenous shock to this government's policy preferences or to the economic environment.
We let F ( ) denote the c.d.f. of . We assume that G is concave in t and satis…es the single crossing property G t > 0: The Foreign government's objective is G (t; ), which we assume is decreasing in t. The governments'joint payo¤ is denoted by G W (t; ) = G(t; ) + G (t; ). We assume G W is concave in t and satis…es the single crossing property G W t > 0. As we will discuss in the next section, this reduced-form framework can be interpreted as capturing a two-sector, perfectly-competitive world in which a large country trades with a small welfare-maximizing country, and in which a trade agreement (TA) is motivated by a terms-oftrade externality.
7 But we note that this framework could also be applied to settings where TAs are motivated by other types of international externalities, such as non-terms-of-trade externalities of the kind emphasized by the "new trade" models of trade agreements (e.g. Ossa, 2011 , Mrazova, 2011 , Bagwell and Staiger, 2012 .
We start by describing the non-cooperative policy choice. We assume the Home government 7 In the literature on trade agreements there is a small tradition of models with a small country and a large country, a prominent example being McLaren (1997). observes before choosing its trade policy, hence the noncooperative policy is given by:
The single crossing property G t > 0 implies that t N ( ) is increasing. The distribution of the shock, F ( ) and the shape of the t N ( ) schedule induce a distribution for the noncooperative policy t N .
We now describe our assumptions regarding the TA. We assume that the agreement is signed ex ante, before is realized, so the timing is the following: (0) the TA is signed; (1) is realized and observed by both countries; (2) t is implemented and payo¤s are realized.
We assume that the TA maximizes the governments' expected joint payo¤ EG W , 8 so the (unconstrained) optimal TA is given by
The single crossing property
We assume that is veri…able and there are no costs of contracting, so the agreement will be contingent on . Given that our main focus is on the possible uncertainty-managing motive for a TA and the potential gains from regulating policy uncertainty, abstracting from contracting imperfections is a natural …rst step.
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Clearly, the noncooperative policy is ine¢ cient because an international policy externality is present, and this motivates governments to sign a TA. When we introduce an explicit trade structure in the next section, this policy externality will operate via terms-of-trade, but for now this can be interpreted as a more general international policy externality.
The international externality is transmitted through the whole distribution of t. For example, if Home's schedule t( ) is changed in such a way that the mean of t remains unchanged but the degree of uncertainty in t changes, this will have an impact on Foreign's expected welfare EG . In order to isolate the "uncertainty motive" for a TA from the "mean motive", we consider the following thought experiment: if we constrain the TA to keep the average t at the noncooperative equilibrium level, is there any role left for a TA? This is the idea behind our notion of "mean preserving agreement" (MPA). If the optimal MPA changes the riskiness of t relative to the noncooperative tari¤ t N ( ), we say that there is an uncertainty-managing motive for a TA. And in this case, if the optimal MPA decreases (increases) the riskiness of t relative to t N ( ), we say that there is an uncertainty-reducing (-increasing) motive for a TA.
Formally, the optimal MPA is de…ned as
where the operator E denotes an expectation over .
Before we study the optimal MPA, we can build intuition by considering a local argument for the simplest possible case. Consider the case where a¤ects Foreign only through the policy t, so that its payo¤ is simply G (t). This can be interpreted as a scenario in which represents a domestic political-economy shock in the Home country.
Start from the noncooperative tari¤ t N ( ) and ask: how can we change the tari¤ schedule locally to achieve an increase in EG W = EG + EG , while preserving the mean of the tari¤?
Since t N ( ) maximizes EG, a small change from t N ( ) will have a second-order e¤ect on EG and a …rst-order e¤ect on EG . Clearly, then, to achieve an increase in EG W we must increase EG . Suppose G is convex in t: then if we change the tari¤ schedule (slightly) in such a way that the new tari¤ is a mean-preserving spread of t N ( ) then this will increase EG (by the now standard Rotschild-Stiglitz, 1970, equivalence result) and thus EG W will also increase.
Likewise, if G is concave in t, we can achieve an increase in EG W by changing the tari¤ schedule in such a way that the new tari¤ is a mean-preserving compression of t N ( ). Therefore this argument suggests that the key condition determining whether the optimal MPA increases or decreases policy uncertainty is the concavity/convexity of the exporter's objective with respect to the policy.
Of course, the argument above suggests only a su¢ cient condition for local improvement over the noncooperative outcome; in particular, one can improve over the noncooperative outcome in many other ways, including by changing the tari¤ schedule in ways that are neither a meanpreserving compression nor spread of t N ( ). But as we show below, this intuition does carry over to the globally optimal MPA (when the single crossing property is satis…ed).
More importantly, however, the Rotschild-Stiglitz type argument no longer applies if the shock a¤ects the Foreign payo¤ G directly, as well as through the policy t. In this case, it is not enough to know whether the exporter's objective is concave or convex with respect to t to determine how the optimal MPA will change policy uncertainty. In what follows, we will …rst derive the result formally, and then we will provide some intuition to highlight its basic logic.
To derive the FOCs for the optimal MPA problem in (2.1) we set up the Lagrangian:
Since the multiplier is constant with respect to , we can rewrite the Lagrangian as follows
and since we can maximize this pointwise we obtain the following FOCs
Note that the FOC requires the marginal contribution of t to joint surplus, G W t , to be equalized across states (realizations of ), and in particular G W t should be equal to the multiplier , which is easily shown to be negative. This will play a key role in our proofs below. Also note that the FOC for the unconstrained optimal agreement is given by G W t (t; ) = 0, so both for the unconstrained optimum and for the optimal MPA, G W t is equalized across states, but in the former case it is equalized at zero, while in the latter case it is equalized at some negative constant.
Using the FOC we can prove: Note that Lemma 1 does not rely on the single crossing properties we assumed for G and G W , while the next result does.
Using Lemma 1 we derive our …rst proposition. In the proposition, we say that the optimal MPA reduces (increases) policy uncertainty if t M P A ( ) is a mean preserving compression 
hence there is no uncertainty-managing motive for a TA.
Proposition 1 states that the presence of an uncertainty-managing motive for a TA is determined by how the shock a¤ects the international policy externality G t , taking into account its direct e¤ect and its indirect e¤ect through the policy. In particular, if G t (t N ( ); ) is decreasing (increasing) in there is an uncertainty-reducing (-increasing) motive for a TA. Writing
(where we use a superscript N to indicate that a function is evaluated at t N ( )), the uncertainty motive for a TA can be traced to two key determinants:
(a) Foreign's policy-risk preference (captured by G tt and weighted by
), and (b) the direct impact of the shock on the policy externality holding t constant (as captured by G t ). Recalling that G t < 0, when G t < 0 the shock shifts "up" the marginal externality for given t and works in favor of an uncertainty-reducing motive, and shifts it "down" if G t > 0, so we refer to this as the externality-shifting e¤ect.
Proposition 1 makes clear that the source of the uncertainty matters. In particular, we can distinguish between two types of shock: (1) a "political economy"shock, which a¤ects the Foreign country only through the policy t (in which case G = G (t)); and (2) an "economic"
shock, which a¤ects the Foreign country not only indirectly through the policy t but also directly (in which case G = G (t; )).
In case (1), Proposition 1 says that the uncertainty motive for a TA is determined solely by Foreign's preference for policy risk, as captured by the sign of G tt . This con…rms our initial intuition (described above) based on Rotschild and Stiglitz's (1970) result: when Foreign's objective is concave in t, a MPS in t reduces EG , so there is a negative "risk externality" in trade policy, hence the noncooperative tari¤ is "too risky," and therefore there is value to an agreement that reduces that risk (with the reverse logic holding if Foreign's objective is convex in t). We highlight however that, even in this case where the result is intuitive, it is far from self-evident: in principle the optimal MPA could entail any mean-preserving change in t relative to t N ( ), and since the MPS risk criterion is a partial ordering, it was not a priori obvious that the distribution of t M P A ( ) could be ranked in a MPS sense relative to that of t N ( ).
10
In case (2), the Rotschild-Stiglitz type intuition is no longer adequate: Proposition 1 states that Foreign's policy-risk preference (the sign of G N tt ) is no longer su¢ cient to determine whether there is "too much" or "too little" risk in the noncooperative tari¤. Rather, this is determined by whether the international policy externality G t is increasing or decreasing in at the Nash equilibrium. One way to understand this result intuitively is the following.
Suppose that Foreign's objective is linear in t (i.e. G tt = 0), so that Foreign is trade-policyrisk neutral. Suppose further that G N t < 0, so that the (negative) international externality is stronger when is higher. Then intuitively, since the MPA tari¤ must have the same mean as the noncooperative tari¤, it is jointly preferable for the two countries to reduce the tari¤ in high-states, where the noncooperative tari¤ is higher, and increase it in low-states, where the noncooperative tari¤ is lower, thus the optimal MPA lowers trade policy uncertainty.
To summarize, if shocks are of the political-economy type, Foreign's policy-risk preference is su¢ cient to determine the direction of the uncertainty motive for a TA, but in the case of "economic" shocks this is no longer true, and the externality-shifting e¤ect (G t ) comes into play.
Before concluding this section, we mention an alternative thought experiment that one could consider to isolate the uncertainty motive for a TA. Suppose the Home government can choose a contingent tari¤ t( ) subject to the constraint that this tari¤ have the same mean as the optimal agreement tari¤ t A ( ). If such "mean-preserving unilateral"tari¤ is more risky than t A ( ), then we say that the Nash equilibrium policy is "too risky", and so there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA. One can show that, under this alternative thought experiment, the direction of the uncertainty motive is again determined by the sign of
11 As a consequence, if is a "political economy" shock, the two thought experiments yield the same answer (there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA if and only if G tt < 0). If is an "economic"shock, on the other hand, both thought experiments suggest that the uncertainty motive depends on Foreign's policy-risk preference (G tt ) and on the externality-shifting e¤ect (G t ), but the relative weight of these two terms di¤ers (in one case G tt is weighted by t 
Gains from regulating policy uncertainty
Proposition 1 highlights conditions under which there is an uncertainty-managing motive for a TA, and in this case, whether it calls for a reduction or an increase in policy uncertainty. Next we examine the magnitude of the gains that a TA can o¤er by regulating policy uncertainty, beyond the standard gains associated with regulating the policy mean. In this section we will derive general formulas for these gains, and in section 3 we will apply the formulas to a more structured trade model.
It is natural to de…ne the gain from regulating policy uncertainty as the increase in EG W as-sociated with a move from t
To make progress in understanding what determines this gain, we employ a local approximation approach: we consider a small mean-preserving change in the tari¤ schedule starting from t N ( ) and evaluate the e¤ect of this change on EG W . In particular, consider moving from
where is a small constant and is the mean of . Clearly, if > 0 ( < 0) this represents a small mean-preserving compression (spread) of t N ( ). Letting
, the resulting change in EG W can be approximated as follows:
where 2 denotes the variance of . In the second line of (2.4) we have used the fact that G t = 0 at the Nash tari¤; in the third line we have used a …rst-order Taylor approximation of
as shorthand for
The expression in the last line of (2.4) is intuitive: it states that the value of the MPA is the product of two components, the sensitivity of the policy externality to the shock (
which from Proposition 1 determines the direction of the uncertainty-managing motive, and the variance of .
Since the sign of can be chosen to ensure a positive gain, we can write the approximate value of the MPA asṼ
Next we focus on the more standard gains from managing the mean level of the tari¤. A natural approach is to de…ne an "uncertainty-preserving agreement" (UPA) in the following way. Consider a parallel downward shift of the t N ( ) schedule, say t N ( ) , where is a positive constant. Note that the shifted schedule has the same central higher moments as t N ( ) (variance, skewness, kurtosis), but a lower mean, so the UPA keeps the mean tari¤ constant but allows the rest of the tari¤ distribution to change.
Following similar steps as above, we can derive the approximate value of the UPA:
Intuitively, the gain from reducing the mean tari¤ level is approximately equal to the gain from reducing the tari¤ from its Nash level in the absence of uncertainty (that is, if is …xed at ), which in turn is given by the marginal externality that the tari¤ exerts on the Foreign country.
Next, for future reference we write down the relative gain from managing tari¤ uncertainty versus managing the tari¤ mean:
Finally, we may ask what is the (approximate) overall value of a TA, that is the value of a partial move toward the optimal agreement starting from the noncooperative tari¤. The answer is a simple corollary of the analysis above: the value of a small joint improvement in tari¤ mean and tari¤ uncertainty is a weighted average of expressions (2.4) and (2.6) above, with the weights determined by the relative change in and . Thus, if a certain parameter change increases (weakly) both the value of an MPA and the value of a UPA, it will also increase (weakly) the value of the overall TA. Below we will highlight the implications of this observation within our economic structure. 
Uncertainty and mean motives in a standard trade model
We now open up the black box of government objectives in order to examine how the uncertainty and mean motives for a TA depend on economic fundamentals. Our basic model focuses on the 13 One further question one may ask is: Under what conditions are the uncertainty and mean motives for a TA complements or substitutes? That is, when is the optimal TA more valuable than the sum of its two parts, or case in which shocks are of the "political economy" type. We will later extend the analysis to the case of more general "economic" shocks.
We consider a standard two-country, two-good trade model with competitive markets. Assume Home is the natural exporter of the numeraire good, indexed by 0, while Foreign (the small country) is the natural exporter of the other good, which has no index.
Let p (resp. p ) denote the price of the nonnumeraire good in Home (resp. Foreign). We will often use the logarithms of prices, so let ln p and ln p . The Home country can choose an ad-valorem tari¤ on imports of the non-numeraire good. Let t ln , where is the ad-valorem tari¤ factor. We also allow for an exogenous iceberg trade cost; let denote the logarithm of such a trade cost. The reason we allow for trade costs is not only that such costs are important empirically, but because they will play an important role in determining the gains from regulating policy uncertainty, as will become clear below. By the usual arbitrage condition, if the tari¤ is not prohibitive then we must have = t . Since Foreign has no policy of its own, we can refer to as the "terms-of-trade"(TOT). Since Foreign is small, is determined entirely in the Home country, and we can leave the market clearing condition that determines in the background.
The reason we use the logarithms of the relative price, the tari¤ rate and the trade cost is the following. In general equilibrium settings with uncertainty about relative prices, the conventional notion of risk based on arithmetic mean-preserving spread of relative prices leads to predictions that are sensitive to the choice of numeraire (see for example Flemming et al, 1977) . These scholars have argued that a more robust approach is to de…ne an increase in relative-price risk as a geometric mean preserving spread (GMPS) of the relative price, which is an arithmetic mean preserving spread of the log of the relative price (in our notation, ).
For analogous reasons we de…ne the trade policy as the log of the tari¤ rate.
We next impose some standard assumptions on preferences and technology. To make the key points we only need to specify the economic structure in the Foreign country. On the technology side, we assume constant returns to scale with a strictly concave PPF, so that supply functions are strictly increasing. This allows us to describe the supply side through a GDP (or revenue) function. Letting p be the domestic relative price and (q 0 ; q ) the outputs, we de…ne R (p ) max q 0 ;q fq 0 +p q g s.t. (q 0 ; q ) 2 Q , where Q is the set of feasible outputs.
On the preference side, we assume that all citizens have identical and homothetic preferences. This implies that indirect utility takes the form U
, where y is income in terms of numeraire and (p) a price index. It is natural to refer to
as the representative individual's "real income". For the purposes of comparative statics it is convenient to parametrize the degree of risk aversion, so we assume that U ( ) exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), indexed by the parameter . We further assume that all citizens have identical factor endowments, we normalize the population measure to one, and assume that the Foreign government maximizes social welfare, so we can write
As far as the Home country is concerned, we can keep its economic structure in the background, except for the non-cooperative tari¤ schedule t N ( ). Recall that we are focusing on a political economy shock, so a¤ects Foreign only through t. We interpret as the log of the underlying shock so t N 0 ( ) can be interpreted as the elasticity of the tari¤ factor with respect to the shock; we let " denote this elasticity.
Finally, we assume that Foreign exports the nonnumeraire good for all values of in its support (and hence for all values of p in its support), or in other words, the trade pattern cannot switch as a result of the shock.
As made clear by the analysis of section 2, the key to gauge the uncertainty motive for a TA is to consider how the marginal international externality exerted by the Home tari¤, G t , responds to the shock . In our model Home's tari¤ exerts only a TOT externality on Foreign welfare, given by
where v R is Foreign's real income and p x R is Foreign's degree of openness (export to GDP ratio). Intuitively, the degree of openness captures the impact of an increase in t on Foreign's real income through TOT, and the factor v is related to the marginal utility of income: with < 0, the externality is stronger when real income (v ) is lower (for a given level of openness), because the marginal utility of income is then higher. In what follows we will refer to v as the "adjusted"degree of openness.
We start by focusing on the benchmark case of income-risk neutrality.
Since we are adopting the GMPS notion of risk (as we discussed above), it is natural to de…ne risk neutrality as indi¤erence with respect to a GMPS of real income, which corresponds to the case: V = ln (y = ), or ! 0 in the CRRA speci…cation. Thus in this case the government's objective is G = ln
, and the international externality is simply G t = .
The key step to apply Proposition 1, given that is a political economy shock, is to examine the Foreign country's attitude toward policy risk, as captured by G tt . This is given by the impact of t on adjusted openness, which is easily shown to be
where " x is the export supply elasticity and D 1 p q R is the GDP share of the importcompeting sector, which can be interpreted as the degree of income diversi…cation.
We will assume throughout that " x is nonnegative. 14 Given this assumption, it follows that G tt j !0 > 0: thus, in the case of income-risk neutrality, the Foreign country bene…ts from an increase in policy risk. The intuition for this result is that, since production and consumption can be optimized after observing prices, both the producers'revenue function and the consumers'indirect utility functions (given income) are convex in prices. The insight that a small country may gain from TOT risk in itself is not new to our model, and was pointed out for example by Eaton (1979) ; what is new is that in light of Proposition 1, the convexity of G with respect to t implies that the optimal MPA increases trade-policy uncertainty.
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To summarize, if individuals are income-risk neutral, there is an uncertainty-managing motive for a TA, but this calls for an increase -rather than a decrease -in trade-policy uncertainty.
Evidently, then, if one wants to make economic sense of the WTO-type informal arguments discussed in the introduction, which state that one of the goals of TAs is to reduce trade policy uncertainty, one must depart from the benchmark case of income-risk neutrality in this standard model and focus on the case of income-risk aversion, which is what we do next.
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Let us now re-examine the Foreign country's preference for trade-policy risk allowing for income-risk aversion ( < 0). 17 Recalling that the international externality from the tari¤ is 14 There is considerable empirical evidence that this is the case in reality for most sectors and most countries (see for example Tokarick, 2010) . 15 The role of the degree of specialization on whether a small economy gains from ‡uctuating terms-of-trade is discussed by Anderson and Riley (1976) . Young and Anderson (1982) examine the role of risk aversion on the unilateral choice of a small economy between tari¤s and quotas. 16 It is important to note that this feature extends well beyond the simple perfectly-competitive setting we are considering here. In particular, one might wonder whether the presence of imperfect competition or irreversible investments might make exporting …rms' pro…t functions concave in prices, but even in these circumstances pro…t functions are typically convex in prices. The intuitive reason is that pro…t functions are convex whenever …rms can make any ex-post adjustment in their production decisions after observing prices, and this feature is extremely general. As an example, consider Handley and Limão's (2012) setting where exporting …rms face uncertainty and make irreversible investments: in that setting as well, pro…t functions are convex in prices.
17 Note that, even with income risk aversion, in the Foreign country there is still no motive for trade protection, so our assumption that this country practices free trade continues to be without loss of generality given the given by G t = v and di¤erentiating this expression with respect to t, we obtain
This expression (which is derived in Appendix within the proof of Proposition 2), together with the result of Proposition 1, leads to:
Proposition 2. The optimal MPA reduces trade-policy uncertainty relative to the noncooperative equilibrium, and hence there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA, if +" x +D < 0 at the noncooperative equilibrium. The reverse is true if +" x +D > 0 at the non-cooperative equilibrium.
There are several aspects of Proposition 2 that are worth highlighting. First, if incomerisk aversion is su¢ ciently strong relative to the other parameters of the model (namely if
, then there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA. While this statement is not too surprising in itself, the impact of the other variables on the uncertainty motive is more subtle.
Proposition 2 states that, for a given degree of risk-aversion < 0, the uncertainty motive for a TA is more likely to be in the direction of reducing policy uncertainty when: (a) the economy is more open ( is higher); (b) the export supply elasticity " x is lower; and (c) the economy is more specialized (D is lower).
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Start by focusing on the degree of openness . This variable a¤ects the uncertainty motive through its interaction with the income-risk preference parameter , so the role of openness in essence is to magnify the impact of the citizens'income-risk preference.
representative-citizen assumption. As Eaton and Grossman (1985) made clear, in a small country an insurance motive for trade protection can arise only if citizens have heterogenous incomes, at least ex-post. In our setting, Foreign citizens are always homogenous, even ex-post. This will be true also in the next section, where we consider a dynamic setting with ex-ante investments. 18 Here we can make the statements in the text a bit more precise. First, when we say that the uncertainty motive is "more likely" to be in the direction of reducing policy uncertainty when a variable x is higher, we mean that as x increases the sign of G N tt can switch from negative to positive but not vice-versa. Second, in the text we talk about changes in , D and " x as if these variables were exogenous, but of course they are not. To make our statements more precise, let denote the vector of all technology and preference parameters (excluding ). We can think of the key endogenous variables , D and " x as functions of . Note that does not a¤ect these variables. Next note that 2 [0; 1] and D 2 [0; 1], while " x 0 by assumption. In the text, when we refer to a change in an endogenous variable, we mean that the parameter vector is being changed in such a way that the variable of interest changes while the others do not. If we include in the whole technology and preference structure, by varying we can span the whole feasible range of , D and " x , so this "all else equal" thought experiment can be performed.
Next consider the role of the export supply elasticity " x . Intuitively, a country that can easily adjust production and consumption as a result of the shocks (that is, a country with a higher " x ) is more likely to have a welfare function that is convex in the foreign tari¤, and hence is less likely to bene…t from a decrease in tari¤ uncertainty. This in turn suggests an interesting implication. At the empirical level, lower-income countries tend to have lower export supply elasticities, and this in turn implies that the uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA should be more important for lower-income countries than for higher-income countries.
19
Focus next on the degree of diversi…cation, D . Proposition 2 indicates that, other things equal, the uncertainty motive for a TA is more likely to be in the direction of reducing policy uncertainty if the Foreign country is less diversi…ed. A related remark is the following: assuming that preferences are Cobb-Douglas and the supply function q (p ) is di¤erentiable, if the economy is su¢ ciently specialized (D is su¢ ciently close to zero) then there is an uncertaintyreducing motive for any < 0.
20 Interestingly, these twin observations go in the same direction as the one we made above about " x : to the extent that lower-income countries are more likely to be specialized, our model predicts that the uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA should tend to be more important for lower-income countries.
Finally, it is interesting to consider the impact of the exogenous trade cost , which we have thus far left in the background. A preliminary observation is that a decrease in leads to an increase in the degree of openness and a decrease in the degree of diversi…cation D ; this is intuitive, since the decrease in a¤ects Foreign only through an increase in p , which leads to a reallocation of resources toward the export sector. We consider the following thought experiment. Let prohib be the level of at which there is no trade ( = 0), and consider the e¤ect of decreasing from prohib to zero. Suppose risk aversion is strong enough 19 See for example Tokarick (2010) , who estimates that the median export supply elasticity is 0.52 for low income countries, 0.77 for low/medium income countries, 0.83 for medium/high income countries, 0.92 for high income non-OECD countries, and 1.14 for high income OECD countries. These estimates are based on a standard trade model for a small economy with one export, one import and one non-traded good, with no own consumption of the export good.
20 To see this, recall that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive if < " x +D . In the limit as the country becomes fully specialized,
x " c , where " q is the elasticity of q (p ) and " c is the elasticity of c (p ). Cobb-Douglas preferences imply c = R p , where is the consumption share of the non-numeraire good, hence
Given the assumption that q (p ) is smooth, in the limit as the economy becomes fully specialized clearly q 0 (p ) must approach zero (because of the resource constraint), hence " q ! 0, which implies " x ! 0. And since > 0, then " x +D ! 0. So we can conclude that for any …xed < 0 the condition < " x +D is satis…ed if the economy is su¢ ciently specialized. that in the absence of trade costs there is an uncertainty-reducing motive. Clearly, as drops below prohib , initially the uncertainty motive for a TA goes in the direction of increasing policy uncertainty (because is negligible and hence dominated by " x + D ), but as drops further, the direction of the uncertainty motive will at some point reverse and call for a reduction in policy uncertainty. Thus we can state:
Remark 1. Assume risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong, in the sense that < " x +D
=0
. If the trade cost is close enough to its prohibitive level, there is an uncertainty-increasing motive for a TA ( + " x + D > 0), while if is close enough to zero there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA (
If " x does not decrease too fast with , we can make the additional statement that + " x + D is monotonic in and will switch sign exactly once. If on the other hand " x decreases quickly with , then + " x + D may not be monotonic, but the result in Remark 1 is still valid.
To sum up, if one believes that exogenous trade costs have been declining over time, the model broadly suggests that uncertainty-reducing motives for TAs should emerge and become more important as the world becomes more integrated. We will come back to this theme in the next section, where we consider the potential gains from regulating trade-policy uncertainty.
Gains from regulating policy uncertainty in a standard trade model
In this section we examine the gains that a TA can o¤er by regulating trade-policy uncertainty and compare them with the more standard gains from regulating the trade-policy mean. To this end, we apply the general formulas developed in section 2.1.
Given that the political economy shock a¤ects Foreign welfare only through Home's tari¤ t, we have
. Plugging the expression for G t and G tt developed above in the general formulas of section 2.1, we obtain:
The approximate value of an MPA starting from the noncooperative equilibrium isṼ
(ii) The approximate value of a UPA starting from the noncooperative equilibrium is
(iii) The relative value of an MPA versus a UPA is:
where all expressions are evaluated at the noncooperative tari¤.
Proposition 3 provides an approximation of the potential gains that a TA can o¤er by managing trade policy uncertainty, in absolute terms (part (i)), and relative to the gains from managing the trade policy mean (part (iii)).
It is worth highlighting the role of two key determinants of these gains: the variance of the shock, 2 , which can be interpreted as capturing the degree of uncertainty in the political/economic environment, and the exogenous trade cost .
Focus …rst on the role of 2 . Other things equal, when 2 is higher the importance of the uncertainty motive for a TA, as captured byṼ M P A , is higher. 21 On the other hand, 2 has no impact on the mean motive for a TA, as captured byṼ U P A . And as we discussed at the end of section 2.1, these observations imply that a higher 2 leads to larger overall gains from a TA.
22 Thus, at a broad level, our model suggests that governments should have stronger incentives to sign trade agreements when the trading environment is more uncertain.
Next focus on the impact of the trade cost . Consider …rst how a¤ects the relative gains from regulating policy uncertainty (Ṽ M P A =Ṽ U P A ). We continue to assume <
, 21 Note that 2 has no impact on any of the other variables that appear inṼ M P A orṼ U P A , including " . This is because in the noncooperative equilibrium Home chooses the tari¤ after observing , so the schedule t N ( ) does not itself depend on 2 . 22 This point can also be made by looking at the full gains from the optimal TA, if one is willing to approximate the payo¤ functions with quadratic functions. To see this, write the value of the optimal TA as E > 0, which is always satis…ed if t
as in the previous section. As observed above, is decreasing in and D is increasing in , which implies that there is a critical , say^ , for which + " x + D = 0. To simplify, we assume that^ is unique. Under this assumption, the relative gainṼ M P A =Ṽ U P A is nonmonotonic in . To see this, note that when is close to prohib , the relative gain is strictly positive (with the gains from the MPA coming from an increase in uncertainty); when is equal to^ the ratioṼ M P A =Ṽ U P A reaches zero; and if is lower than^ this ratio is strictly positive again, but this time the gains from the MPA come from a decrease in uncertainty.
Next we focus on how a¤ects the gain from decreasing the mean tari¤,Ṽ U P A . The key is to note that a change in has the same impact on the adjusted openness v as a change in t, so
, and we already know that
which by our de…nition of^ is the case when >^ . Thus we can conclude that, as drops from its prohibitive level,Ṽ U P A initially rises, then reaches a maximum at =^ , and subsequently falls. Thus we can state:
and that^ is unique. Then: (i) The relative gains from regulating policy uncertainty (Ṽ M P A =Ṽ U P A ) are non-monotonic in , with a minimum value of zero at =^ . (ii) The gains from decreasing the tari¤ mean (Ṽ U P A ) are non-monotonic in , reaching a maximum at =^ .
This result suggests that, when trade costs are low enough that there is an uncertaintyreducing motive for a TA ( <^ ), further reductions in trade costs will tend to increase the relative gains from reducing trade-policy uncertainty and shrink the absolute gains from reducing the trade-policy mean. Thus, at a broad level, our model suggests that, as the world becomes more integrated, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty should tend to become more important relative to the gains from reducing the mean levels of trade barriers.
A su¢ cient statistic for the uncertainty motive
If one is willing to assume that the model is true, one can in principle use the model to check the direction of the uncertainty motive for a TA between two countries. In this section we illustrate with a simple example how this could be done with actual data.
We start by developing an alternative condition for the direction of the uncertainty motive.
As we observed above, there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA if the (negative) international externality from the noncooperative tari¤, ( v ) N , is stronger for higher levels of the shock , that is if
Recalling that t N ( ) is increasing, it is clear that this condition can be equivalently written as
We can interpret this expression as an induced elasticity, that is the elasticity of (v ) N with respect to the tari¤ (recall t N is the log of the tari¤ factor) induced by the variation in the underlying shock. In principle, one can use information on openness, real income per capita (v ) and estimates of to construct a measure of the adjusted degree of openness. The analysis above then implies that if this measure co-varies with noncooperative tari¤s then there is an uncertainty reducing motive for a TA. We record this in the following remark:
Remark 3. There is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA if, at the noncooperative equilibrium, the adjusted degree of openness v co-varies with the tari¤.
Next we illustrate how this condition can be used to check the direction of the uncertainty motive for a TA. But before proceeding, note that in principle we could use another condition, namely the sign of the expression +" x +D . The reason we choose to focus on the condition in Remark 3 is that it is valid regardless of the nature of the shock, whereas the condition based on the sign of + " x + D is valid only in the case of political-economy shocks.
23
Our model is static in nature, but it seems natural to use the time variation in noncooperative tari¤s and adjusted openness to measure their correlation. We focus on the annual US average tari¤ prior to 1934, the year of the Reciprocal trade agreement act (RTAA), which "ended"the Smoot-Hawley era and started a period of more cooperative trade policies (Irwin, 1998) . More speci…cally, we use t = ln(1 + ), where is the US import-weighted average tari¤ starting in 1867 calculated by Irwin (2007) . We start by plotting the time series of the US average tari¤ from 1867 to 1934 in Figure 2 . Note that there is considerable variation in the average tari¤ in the non-cooperative period. Part of this variation is simply a downward trend, 24 but note that there is a considerable amount of variation around the trend. 23 The fact that the condition in Remark 3 is valid regardless of the nature of the shock should be clear from the general result of Proposition 1, which states that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive if the international externality from the tari¤ at the Nash equilibrium is stronger for higher levels of . This will be con…rmed in section 4 below. 24 This trend is probably due to the fact that the revenue motives for imposing tari¤s (which were arguably important before the civil war) declined over time for various reasons, including the introduction of the income tax in 1916.
The …rst agreement that the US signed under the RTAA was with Cuba in 1934. This, together with the fact that Cuba was a small open country (its export share of GDP was on average 0.32) with a considerable amount of trade with the US, makes the US-Cuba pair a good …t to illustrate how our correlation test can be performed. We use data available for Cuba on openness and income per capita in the period 1903-1933 to calculate a measure of adjusted openness at alternative levels of risk aversion.
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As a preliminary exercise, in Figure 3 we focus on a speci…c value for the risk aversion parameter, = 5, and plot the corresponding adjusted openness, ln(v ), against t. 26 The …gure shows a strong positive correlation. Table 1 goes one step further and provides alternative measures of (rank) correlation between these two variables for a range of risk aversion levels. We note two points. First, the correlation is negative if there is no risk aversion (…rst row). Second, if the risk aversion is su¢ ciently high (-2 to -10) the correlation is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This result is independent of whether we use t or its detrended value.
We …nd similar results using a simple correlation measure. We do not have estimates of risk aversion for Cuba, but we note that Kimbal et al (2008) estimate CRRA coe¢ cients for US households (by using their preferences towards di¤erent gambles), …nding that the median CRRA coe¢ cient is -5.3, similar to what we use in Figure 3 , and about 90% of the distribution is estimated to be below -1.5.
In sum, this section illustrates how the model can be used to check whether there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA between two countries. The positive correlation between US tari¤s and Cuban adjusted openness suggests that this was indeed the case for these countries in the period before their 1934 agreement. It is important to emphasize, however, that this exercise is not a test of the model, but rather it assumes that the model is true and so it must be taken with a grain of caution, since the model is very stylized. The message we want to convey is that it is feasible to take our model to the data in a meaningful way, and it might be desirable to develop richer and more realistic versions of our model in order to quantify the uncertainty-related gains from TAs.
Impact of MPA on trade volume
The next question we address is, what is the impact of the optimal MPA on the expected volume of trade? To …x ideas, suppose that the optimal MPA leads to a mean preserving compression in t. Note that trade volume can be written as x ( ), so the change in expected log trade due to the MPA is
, where F N ( ) (resp. F M P A ( )) is the distribution of induced by t N ( ) (resp. t M P A ( )). Noting that a mean preserving compression in t leads to a mean preserving compression in , by standard Rotschild-Stiglitz logic it is immediate to conclude that expected log trade increases if and only if Foreign's export supply elasticity " x is decreasing in . Also note that the same conclusion applies to the (log)
trade value + ln x ( ), since an MPA keeps E (t) and thus E ( ) unchanged.
In general the export supply function can have increasing or decreasing elasticity, so this is ultimately an empirical question. It is interesting to relate this analysis with a central result of the TOT theory of trade agreements, highlighted by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) and other papers by the same authors, namely that TAs always expand trade between countries. Thus the mean motive for TAs has an unambiguous expanding impact on trade. In contrast, the uncertainty motive for TAs in general may impact trade volume in either direction.
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There is a special but interesting case where the model yields a more de…nite prediction concerning the impact of a decrease in trade policy uncertainty on expected trade. This is the same case we considered above when highlighting that an uncertainty-reducing motive is more likely to be present for lower-income countries. We showed above that, if preferences are Cobb-Douglas and Foreign is su¢ ciently specialized, then the optimal MPA reduces policy uncertainty for any < 0. In this case, the export supply elasticity " x must be decreasing in around the point of full specialization, since it is zero if the country is fully specialized (and we assumed " x 0). As a consequence, a decrease in policy uncertainty increases expected trade. This suggests that countries heavily specialized in commodities are not only more likely to bene…t from a reduction in policy uncertainty, as we argued above, but also more likely to experience an increase in expected trade as policy uncertainty decreases.
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27 One can also ask how the optimal MPA a¤ects trade volatility. It is easy to show that in the "neutral"case of constant export supply elasticity, an MPA that reduces policy uncertainty also reduces trade volatility. Thus there is a tendency for the optimal MPA to impact policy uncertainty and trade (volume and value) uncertainty in the same direction. But if the export supply elasticity is not constant, the impact of a change in policy uncertainty on trade volatility is ambiguous. 28 We can provide an approximate measure of the impact of the MPA on expected trade, along similar lines as the approximation of the welfare gains from an MPA that we derived in section 3.1. Considering a small
More general economic shocks
Thus far we have focused on shocks of the political-economy kind, which a¤ect Foreign welfare only through Home's tari¤ t. We now extend the analysis to the case of more general economic shocks, allowing to a¤ect Foreign welfare not just through the policy but also directly; conventional demand or supply shocks in Home and/or in Foreign in general will have this feature.
To apply the condition derived in the reduced-form analysis of section 2, start by recalling that Foreign's terms-of-trade are given (in logarithmic form) by (t; ) = ( ) t. This notation emphasizes that the shock may a¤ect Foreign's terms-of-trade, holding the policy t constant, through Home's domestic price; this will be the case if the domestic shock a¤ects economic conditions at Home. In addition to a¤ecting Foreign welfare through the terms-oftrade channel just highlighted, the shock may a¤ect Foreign welfare directly (that is, holding TOT constant); this will be the case for example if represents a global demand or supply shock. To emphasize the two distinct channels through which can a¤ect Foreign welfare for given policy t, we start by writing Foreign's welfare in reduced form as a function of the terms-of-trade and the shock as V ( (t; ); ) = V ( ( ) t ; ). Recalling that the Foreign government maximizes national welfare, we can write G (t; ) = V ( ( ) t ; ).
Recall from section 2 that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA if G , plugging in the expression (3.2) for G N tt and simplifying, we …nd that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA if
where
denotes the elasticity of adjusted openness with respect to the shock holding constant, " 0 ( ) is the elasticity of Home's domestic price with respect to the shock, and (4.1) is evaluated at the noncooperative tari¤.
mean-preserving spread of the Nash tari¤ of the form t N ( ) + ( ), as we did above, and evaluating its e¤ect around the Nash equilibrium, we …nd
Finally, one can show that the approximate relative impact of an MPA versus a UPA on expected (log) trade is given by [
To interpret (4.1), start by recalling that the sign of Foreign's preference for trade policy risk is given by the sign of ( + " x + D ). Thus the term ( + " x + D ) " in (4.1) is related to the policy-risk preference e¤ect. This term is analogous to the case of political-economy shocks considered in the previous section.
The new feature with more general shocks is the presence of a policy-externality-shifting e¤ect. This e¤ect operates through two possible channels. Recall that Foreign welfare can be written as V ( ( ) t ; ), and recall our discussion above of the two possible channels through which can a¤ect V holding t constant. Similarly, can a¤ect the marginal policy externality (V t ) through two possible channels: the term ( + " x + D ) " in (4.1) captures the impact of on the policy externality through Home's domestic price , and the term
captures the direct impact of on the policy externality holding terms-of-trade constant.
Note that, if the shock is importer speci…c, in the sense that it originates in the Home country and a¤ects Foreign welfare only through the terms-of-trade , only the …rst of the two channels highlighted above is operative, so
To highlight the implications of this type of shock, suppose that Foreign is averse to terms-of-trade risk (or equivalently to trade-policy risk), that is + " x + D < 0. Note that the total impact of on TOT is given by
= " " , so there are two di¤erent sources of TOT risk: a "policy"risk (captured by " > 0) and an "economic"risk (captured by " ). Without economic risk (e.g. in the case of a pure political-economy shock), a mean preserving compression in t clearly reduces TOT risk. And the same is true whenever policy risk is not o¤set by economic risk, so that
But if the economic risk o¤sets the policy risk (" is positive and dominates " ), then TOT risk is reduced by increasing policy risk, so in this case the optimal MPA will increase policy risk.
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Next focus on the case in which the shock is global, in the sense that it a¤ects domestic conditions in both countries (or equivalently, suppose that the two countries experience perfectly correlated domestic shocks). In this case both channels of the policy-externality-shifting 29 In the case of importer-speci…c shocks we can show a further result: under a regularity condition, the optimal MPA reduces terms-of-trade risk if Foreign is averse to terms-of-trade risk (or equivalently to tradepolicy risk), that is if + " x + D < 0. The regularity assumption we need is the following: if we de…ne Home's choice variable as rather than t (which is clearly equivalent), we need Home's noncooperative choice of to be monotonic in , which is ensured if
does not change sign over the relevant range of ( ; ). Thus, in the case of importer-speci…c shocks, the impact of the optimal MPA on TOT risk is determined solely by the Foreign country's preference for TOT/policy risk, and follows the same intuitive pattern as in the case of political economy shocks.
e¤ect that we described above will be operative. The second e¤ect (through
be interpreted as follows: if shocks that increase the noncooperative tari¤ also increase the adjusted degree of openness for a …xed tari¤, this strengthens the uncertainty-reducing motive.
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike in the case of political-economy shocks considered in the previous section, here the direction of the uncertainty motive for a TA may go in a di¤erent direction than Foreign's preference for policy risk. So, for example, it is possible that even if individuals are risk-neutral ( ! 0) and hence the Foreign country is policy-risk loving, there may be an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA.
The sign of the externality-shifting e¤ect in general depends on the exact nature of the shock and of the economic structure, but we now highlight an interesting case in which the externalityshifting e¤ect indeed pushes towards an uncertainty-reducing motive. Suppose that is a global productivity shock that strengthens comparative advantage, so that Foreign's openness is higher (for given TOT) when is higher. Further suppose that Home's noncooperative tari¤ t N increases with trade volume; this is compatible with our model if TOT manipulation motives are important for Home's choice of tari¤. In this case t N is increasing in , as assumed in our model. Then, if the e¤ect of the shock via v is not too strong, the sign of
will be positive, thus contributing towards an uncertainty-reducing motive.
Ex-ante investments
Thus far we have assumed that allocation decisions occur ex post, after the shock is realized.
But in reality there are a variety of production factors that cannot be ‡exibly shifted in response to policy and economic shocks. In this section we consider the implications of allowing for allocation decisions that must be made ex-ante, before the shock is realized, or "ex-ante investments". As we noted in the introduction, the often-heard informal arguments about the motives for TAs claim that they should increase investment and trade by reducing uncertainty.
Allowing for ex-ante investments in our model seems compelling if one wants to formally examine this issue.
We start from our basic model of section 3 with political-economy shocks and extend it to allow for ex-ante investments.
Recall that the model allows for an arbitrary number of factors that are mobile ex-post. We now assume that one of these, "capital," is mobile ex-ante but …xed ex-post. 30 We normalize the endowment of capital to one and let k denote the fraction of capital allocated to the export sector. To simplify the analysis we assume that all factors in the Home country are perfectly ‡exible so they can be allocated after the shock is realized. This allows us to keep the economic structure for Home in the background, as we did in the static model.
We assume the following timing: (0) The tari¤ schedule is selected (cooperatively or noncooperatively); (1) capital is allocated; (2) is realized; (3) the trade policy is implemented and markets clear.
In the noncooperative scenario, we let the Home country choose a contingent schedule t N ( ) to maximize its expected payo¤. In the cooperative scenario, again we let countries choose a schedule t M P A ( ) to maximize expected joint welfare subject to the constraint Et M P A ( ) = Et N ( ). Thus we keep the timing constant across the cooperative and noncooperative scenarios.
The reason for this choice is to abstract from domestic-commitment motives for TAs. And of course, if we want a TA to be able to a¤ect investment decisions by managing policy uncertainty, we need to assume that policy choices come before investment decisions, and this explains our choice of timing.
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The …rst step of the analysis is to extend Proposition 1 from the previous static setting to the present dynamic environment. Since capital is allocated after observing the tari¤ schedule, and the allocation may depend on whether or not an agreement is in place, we write Foreign welfare as G (t ( ) ; k ). We continue to write Home's objective as G(t( ); ), which re ‡ects the assumption that Foreign is a small country.
In keeping with our assumption that there is no role for trade policy intervention in Foreign, we assume that capital is perfectly divisible, so that the citizens of the small country are not only identical ex-ante, but also ex-post, and thus there is no redistribution motive for a tari¤.
This in turn implies that capital in Foreign is e¢ ciently allocated given Home's trade policy, hence k maximizes EG (t( ); k ).
We now argue that Proposition 1 extends to this setting, in the sense that we only need to determine the sign of dG t (t N ( ) ; k )=d to know if there is an uncertainty-reducing role 30 We could allow for a higher number of factors that are mobile ex ante but …xed ex post, but the notation would get more cumbersome. And of course, the model also allows for factors that are fully …xed (immobile both ex ante and ex post).
31 While the assumption is made to provide a clean thought experiment, we note that in some cases countries are able to choose contingent protection programs in ways that represent long-term commitments. For example the U.S. and the E.U. have contingent protection laws that apply in the absence of trade agreements.
for a TA. The following local argument provides some intuition for the result. Starting at t N ( ), a small mean-preserving compression has no …rst order e¤ect on G since this objective is maximized by t N ( ). Therefore, the new schedule will only increase EG W if it increases EG .
Since, as noted above, k maximizes EG (t( ); k ), this policy change has no …rst-order e¤ect on EG via k . So any impact of the policy change on EG must be due to the "static"e¤ect,
i.e. to G N tt < 0. We now consider the full MPA program. Recalling that, for a given t( ), the level of k maximizes EG (t( ); k ) and has no e¤ect on EG, then k maximizes EG W (t( ); ; k ). Thus we can write the MPA program as
Assuming an interior optimum, we obtain the following FOCs:
We can now apply an argument similar to the static model, using the …rst two of the FOC above. The only di¤erence is that the derivative 
, then there is an uncertainty-reducing (-increasing) motive for a TA.
Proposition 4 highlights that the uncertainty motive for the TA is driven by the static e¤ect, i.e. the impact of the shock on the policy externality conditional on the capital level. In a broad sense, we can interpret this result as indicating that there is no separate "investment motive"
in the context of a TA that addresses policy uncertainty.
This conclusion, as we highlighted, relies on the competitive allocation of capital being socially e¢ cient given the importer's trade policy, which is ensured in our setting by the assumptions of welfare maximizing government and perfectly divisible capital. While these assumptions are somewhat restrictive, we note that the same result would obtain in a setting where capital is not divisible, provided the government can use an entry subsidy/tax to e¤ectively control the allocation of capital. 32 Of course one could consider reasonable alternative scenarios where capital allocation is not e¢ cient, and in such scenarios there could be an "investment motive"
for an uncertainty-managing TA, or in other words, there could be scope for a TA to "correct" the capital allocation through changes in policy uncertainty, but it is important to keep in mind that this would be a second-best argument for such TAs, as the …rst-best way to address such ine¢ ciency would be the use of more targeted policies.
Given that the condition for an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA is similar to the static model, the results of the previous sections apply as stated, with the only di¤erence that the relevant expressions are evaluated at a given capital allocation. Moreover, the expressions for the approximate values of an MPA and a UPA are also unchanged, since there is no …rst order e¤ect on Foreign welfare due to capital re-allocation. But even if there is no separate "investment" motive for a MPA, such an agreement in general does a¤ect equilibrium investment and trade levels relative to the noncooperative equilibrium, as we show next.
Investment and trade e¤ects of the MPA
We start by asking how the optimal MPA a¤ects ex-ante investments. We focus on the case in which Foreign is policy-risk averse (G tt < 0), so that the optimal MPA reduces policy risk. To simplify the exposition we also assume that the trade pattern does not switch as k changes, that is, Foreign exports the nonnumeraire good for all k 0.
Recall that e¢ cient capital allocation implies @EG (t;k ) @k = 0. By standard results (Rotschild and Stiglitz, 1971) , the equilibrium k increases as a result of a mean-preserving compression
G tt (t; k ) < 0 for all t in its support. Thus the e¤ect depends on the impact of k 32 To see this note that whether the competitive allocation is e¢ cient or not depends crucially on whether capital is divisible or indivisible. If capital is divisible, all citizens will have identical incomes ex-post, and as a consequence, there is no idiosyncratic risk, hence no scope for insurance markets, which implies the competitive allocation is e¢ cient. There is aggregate risk in this economy, but it cannot be diversi…ed away (since we are not considering international insurance markets). If capital is indivisible, so that each citizen must choose ex-ante whether to allocate her capital to the export sector or the import-competing sector, then ex-post there will be heterogenous agents that will fare di¤erently in di¤erent states. In this situation, the competitive equilibrium is not e¢ cient in the absence of insurance markets, and in general capital will not be allocated e¢ ciently. Of course, this ine¢ ciency can in principle be remedied by government intervention. The …rst-best policy is a contingent transfer scheme that provides insurance to citizens. If such a policy is available, then the ine¢ ciency in the capital allocation will be removed. If the …rst-best policy is not available, but the government can use an entry subsidy/tax to e¤ectively control the allocation of capital, then again the ine¢ ciency in the capital allocation will be removed, and hence
on Foreign's policy-risk preference. In general this e¤ect can go in either direction, but we now highlight a set of su¢ cient conditions under which it is negative. We will show that this is the case if the support of is su¢ ciently small and risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong.
33
Note that the result of Proposition 3 extends directly to this dynamic setting, in the sense that the expression for G tt is just the same as in (3.2), provided its various components are re-interpreted as conditional on the capital allocation k . Subject to this re-interpretation, we
In Appendix we prove that, if is su¢ ciently negative and the support of su¢ ciently small, then @ @k G tt (t; k ) < 0 for all t in its support, which leads to the following:
Proposition 5. If there is su¢ cient income risk aversion and the support of is su¢ ciently small, then the optimal MPA increases investment in the export sector.
Broadly interpreted, this proposition suggests that under the condition that generates an uncertainty-reducing motive for a TA, namely a strong degree of income-risk aversion, the agreement leads to higher investment in the export sector, provided the underlying uncertainty in the environment is small enough. We also note that the same result would hold if we replaced the condition that is su¢ ciently negative with the alternative condition that the export supply elasticity " x is su¢ ciently close to constant, as we show in Appendix.
Finally we re-examine the impact of the optimal MPA on expected trade volume in the presence of ex-ante investments.
Recall …rst that, in the absence of ex-ante investment, if the MPA reduces policy uncertainty, expected trade increases if and only if the export supply elasticity " x ( ) is decreasing in .
In the presence of ex-ante investment, we can write trade volume as x ( ; k ), thus the MPA 33 The general ambiguity of the impact of mean-preserving changes in prices on investment decisions is well known. In the literature this ambiguity is resolved in di¤erent ways, e.g. assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion, positing a speci…c shock distribution, restricting the economic environment or, as we do, considering cases with small uncertainty. But we emphasize that our result is novel: we are not aware of any existing result that expresses a similar set of su¢ cient conditions for a similar economic environment. We also note that we could prove the result under the alternative assumption that the probability mass is su¢ ciently concentrated, rather than the support being su¢ ciently small, but in this case the notation and the analysis would be more cumbersome.
increases expected log trade if and only if the following is positive
where k M P A and k N are respectively the equilibrium capital levels at the optimal MPA and at the Nash equilibrium, and F k N and F k M P A are the respective distributions of . The …rst term in the expression above is analogous to the one in the static model, so it depends on whether Summarizing, if risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong and uncertainty is su¢ ciently small, the optimal MPA reduces uncertainty in trade policy and increases investment in the export sector.
Moreover, under these conditions, expected trade increases provided the export supply elasticity does not increase too rapidly with TOT. 
Two policy-active countries
In this section we extend our basic model by allowing for two policy-active countries. We focus on the reduced-form framework of section 2 and abstract from ex-ante investments for simplicity.
We represent the reduced-form payo¤ functions as G(t; t ; ) and G (t ; t; ). The central di¤erence relative to the small-large country setting is the presence of two policy dimensions.
For tractability, we assume that countries are mirror-image symmetric. And we continue to assume a single dimension of uncertainty, or = ; the interpretation is that there is a global shock that a¤ects symmetrically the two countries, or equivalently, two domestic shocks that are perfectly correlated.
34 To see this, note that
@R @k is the ex-post di¤erential in the rate of return to capital across sectors. This di¤erential is zero in expectation under risk neutrality, while it can di¤er from zero with risk aversion, but if the shock has small support it is close to zero at the optimal ex-ante allocation. Thus if the support of is su¢ ciently small then @x @k > 0, provided that @q @k > 0, which is the case if the economy is not completely specialized. 35 One might ask also how an MPA a¤ects the volatility of trade ‡ows. When " x is not constant, this impact is ambiguous, but it is direct to show that in the "neutral" case where " x is constant, an MPA that decreases trade policy uncertainty decreases uncertainty in trade volume, i.e. ln x N is a MPS of ln x M P A .
Given symmetry, we de…ne the common payo¤ given a common tari¤ t asG(t; ) G(t; t; ).
We make the following assumptions:
(i) Single crossing properties:G t > 0, G t > 0 (and by symmetry, G t > 0);
(ii) Concavity:G concave in t, G concave in t (and by symmetry, G concave in t );
(iii) Stability of reaction functions: jG tt j > G tt (and analogously for Foreign).
Given that countries are symmetric, the Nash equilibrium tari¤s are symmetric, and implicitly de…ned by the following FOC:
This condition yields the Nash equilibrium tari¤ schedule t N ( ). Given our assumptions, t N ( ) is increasing, as can be veri…ed by implicitly di¤erentiating the FOC:
where the numerator is positive by the single crossing property and the denominator is positive by the stability assumption.
Given the symmetry of the problem, it is reasonable to focus on the optimal symmetric MPA, which is given by:
We can write the Lagrangian for this problem as
Maximizing this Lagrangian pointwise yields the FOCs
We can then prove the following: We can now contrast the result of Proposition 6 with the corresponding result for the small-large country setting. The general condition for a policy uncertainty reducing motive,
< 0, is similar to the small-large setting, but in the large-large country setting this expression includes an additional term, namely G N tt . We label this the "strategic interaction" e¤ect, which is positive if tari¤s are strategic complements and negative if they are strategic substitutes. Thus an interesting new insight that emerges is that the strategic-interaction e¤ect works in favor of the uncertainty reducing motive if tari¤s are strategic substitutes, and vice-versa if tari¤s are strategic complements. Whether tari¤s are strategic substitutes or complements depends on the speci…cs of the trade structure (see for example Syropoulos, 2002) , so the direction of this e¤ect is ultimately an empirical question.
Note also that, while the other terms are similar to the small-large country setting, they will re ‡ect additional e¤ects when we consider speci…c trade structures. In particular, the attitude towards policy risk G N tt and the externality-shifting e¤ect G N t will now include tari¤-revenue and pass-through elasticity e¤ects that were absent in the small-large country setting.
Finally, it can be shown that the expressions derived in section 2.1 for the gains from regulating policy uncertainty and policy mean (and the ratio between the two) are still valid as stated in this symmetric-country setting.
Conclusion
In this paper we examine the often-heard argument that a trade agreement can provide gains to its member countries by decreasing uncertainty in trade policies, in addition to the more standard gains from reducing the level of trade barriers. We consider a standard trade model where trade agreements are motivated by terms-of-trade externalities, noncooperative trade policies are uncertain because of shocks to the political-economic environment, and individuals may be income risk-averse. We …nd that the uncertainty-managing motive for a trade agreement is determined by interesting trade-o¤s. Among the most notable results, we …nd that for a given degree of risk aversion an uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement is more likely to be present when the economy is more open, the export supply elasticity is lower and the economy is more specialized. The model suggests that, as the world becomes more integrated, the gains from decreasing trade-policy uncertainty should tend to become more important relative to the gains from reducing average trade barriers. Furthermore, governments have more to gain by joining a trade agreement when the trading environment is more uncertain. We develop a simple "su¢ cient statistic" to determine whether there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for a trade agreement, and illustrate how it can be taken to the data by focusing on the bilateral trading relationship between the US and Cuba before their trade agreement in 1934. Finally, we examine conditions under which an uncertainty-reducing trade agreement will increase investment in the export sector and raise expected trade volume.
There are several potentially interesting avenues for future research. Here we mention three of them. First, in this paper we have abstracted from contracting frictions. As mentioned in the introduction, we believe this is a natural …rst step given that our main focus is the potential gains from regulating policy uncertainty, but it would be interesting to examine how results would change in the presence of contracting frictions.
37 Second, it would be desirable to examine the role of uncertainty-reducing trade agreements in settings where the underlying reason for the agreement is not the classic TOT externality: in particular, one might consider settings in which agreements are motivated by the governments'need for domestic commitment, or by the presence of non-TOT international externalities. Finally, a challenging but potentially fruitful direction of research would be to develop a richer version of our model with the objective of taking it to a comprehensive dataset: this would probably require, among other things, allowing for multiple countries, multiple goods and imperfectly correlated shocks across countries.
37 A full analysis of this question is bound to be a complex task, but here we can make a simple observation. Suppose that because of contracting frictions the agreement must be non-contingent, and, for simplicity, focus on contracts that specify just an exact tari¤ level. Then we believe that we would obtain qualitatively similar insights as in our frictionless setting, in the following sense. If the …xed tari¤ under the agreement (set at the non-cooperative mean) entails a higher expected joint payo¤ than the non-cooperative tari¤ schedule, then we can say that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive for an agreement. Focusing for simplicity on the case of a political-economy shock, one can show that there is an uncertainty-reducing motive if the Foreign payo¤ is su¢ ciently concave in the tari¤. The condition would thus be similar to the one in proposition 1, but more stringent.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1:
We start by proving part (ii). The schedules t M P A ( ) and t N ( ) are clearly continuous. The mean constraint and the continuity of t M P A ( ) and t N ( ) ensure the existence of at least one intersection. Consider one such intersection^ , so that
We next prove part (i), focusing on the case
) and t N ( ) must intersect at least once. We now argue that t M P A ( ) can only intersect t N ( ) from above. This, together with continuity, will also ensure the uniqueness of the intersection.
We argue by contradiction. Suppose t M P A ( ) intersects t N ( ) at some point^ from below. Consider two values of on the opposite sides of this intersection, 1 <^ < 2 ;such that t M P A ( 1 ) < t N ( 1 ) and t M P A ( 2 ) > t N ( 2 ).
Recalling that G t (t N ( ); ) = 0 and First observe that G t > 0 implies t N ( ) is increasing, and G W t > 0 implies t M P A ( ) is increasing (this can be proved by implicitly di¤erentiating the FOC for the MPA problem and recalling that is independent of ). G t (t N ( ); ) < 0. By Lemma 1, in this case t M P A ( ) intersects t N ( ) once and from above. We show that the random variable t N ( ) is a second order stochastic shift of the random variable t M P A ( ), which together with the fact that these two random variables have the same mean implies that the former is a MPS of the latter. Let N (t) denote the inverse of t N ( ) and M P A (t) the inverse of t M P A ( ); these inverse functions exist because t N ( ) and t M P A ( ) are both increasing. Also, lett be the value of t for which the two curves intersect.
Part (i). Focus on the case
The cdf of t N is given by F N (t) = P r(t N ( ) t) = P r( N (t)) and the cdf of t M P A is given by F M P A (t) = P r(t M P A ( ) t) = P r( M P A (t)). Lemma 1 implies that M P A (t) < N (t) for all t <t and M P A (t) > N (t) for all t >t, which in turn implies that F M P A (t) < F N (t) for all t <t and F M P A (t) > F N (t) for all t >t. This implies that t N ( ) is a second order stochastic shift of t M P A ( ), as claimed.
Part (ii) was already proved in Lemma 1. QED
Proof of Proposition 2:
Start by noting that G tt = @ 2 G @(ln p ) 2 . It is straightforward to derive:
where ln v = ln R ln . Next note that
. Di¤erentiating this elasticity with respect to ln p and simplifying, we obtain:
Next note that employing Roy's identity we obtain Adding things up and simplifying, we …nd G tt = v ( + " x + D ). QED
Proof of Proposition 4:
We start by proving part (b). The schedules t M P A ( ) and t N ( ) are clearly continuous. The mean constraint and the continuity of t M P A ( ) and t N ( ) ensure the existence of at least one intersection. Consider one such intersection^ , so that t M P A (^ ) = t N (^ ). By the FOC, G W t (t N (^ );^ ; k M P A ) = . Since G t (t N (^ );^ ) = 0 this implies G t (t N (^ );^ ; k M P A ) = . Now if We next prove part (a). Again, t M P A ( ) and t N ( ) must intersect at least once. We now argue that if G t (t N ( ); ; k M P A ) < 0 for all then t M P A ( ) can only intersect t N ( ) from above. This, together with continuity, will also ensure the uniqueness of the intersection.
Recalling that G t (t N ( ); ) = 0 for all k and assuming The claim follows. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5
As a …rst step, we argue that an increase in k leads to a decrease in the degree of diversi…cation D . We can write D = 1 will be small in absolute value, and hence @ @k p c R will also be small in absolute value. This ensures that if the support is small enough, is increasing in k .
Next note that a change in k in general has an ambiguous e¤ect on the export supply elasticity " x , so in general the e¤ect of k on ( + " x + D ) is ambiguous, however if risk aversion is su¢ ciently strong, i.e. if is su¢ ciently negative, then clearly the e¤ect is negative. If " x is approximately constant we do not require to be su¢ ciently negative. is the relative change in real income due to a capital re-allocation. This is zero under certainty, and under uncertainty it necessarily changes sign over the range of k , since if it was always positive or negative there would be an incentive to re-allocate capital. We now argue that if is su¢ ciently negative and the support of p is small enough, the expression above is negative. Fix at some level^ such that h < 0 and We argue by contradiction. Suppose t M P A ( ) intersects t N ( ) at some point^ from below. Consider two values of on the opposite sides of this intersection, 1 <^ < 2 ;such that t M P A ( 1 ) > t N ( 1 ) and t M P A ( 2 ) > t N ( 2 ).
Recalling that G t (t N ( ); t N ( ); ) = 0 and This contradicts the FOC, which requires thatG t (t M P A ( ); ) be equalized across states.
Having proved the analog of Lemma 1, the claim of the proposition follows immediately: just observe that the assumed single crossing properties imply t N ( ) and t M P A ( ) are increasing, and apply a similar argument to that in the proof of Proposition 1. QED 
